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FIRMS’ FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS
We investigate if firms’ tapping international markets show more vulnerable balance-sheets 
than historical records. Building on descriptive evidence, and a non-parametric analysis, we 
conclude that firms’ balance-sheets are not more overstretched. Firms’ leverage is similar 
than in past. Although firms are less profitable, they have improved their liquidity profile, and 
show higher debt-service capacity. Though, firms’ access to international capital markets is 
easier, since yields have compressed, and maturities lengthened. Overall, firms’ ability to tap 
markets does not seem to derive from an improvement in their balance-sheets. Beyond this 
big picture, we identify tail risks. The volume issued by more overstretched firms has 
increased. There are also severe data gaps, and there is substantially less information 
for non-listed firms. To investigate these issues, we construct a novel data set containing 
information on bond issuances and firms’ balance-sheets for the period 2000-2013.
The growth of market-based financing is probably the most defining feature of the post-
crisis financial markets.1 The easy access to capital markets by emerging economies’ 
non-financial corporations is deemed particularly noticeable. However, there is considerable 
uncertainty about most of its features, including its actual size. Non-financial corporations’ 
debt issuances at international capital markets, according to the BIS nationality measure, 
amounted for 100 US bn in 2013, well ahead, of the 31 US bn back in 2007. Since this 
criterion classifies deals according to the nationality of the parent company, it accounts for 
issuances when companies use non-financial subsidiaries incorporated overseas 
[McCauley et al. (2013), Turner (2014), or Shin (2013, 2014)]. However, non-financial firms’ 
actual issuances could be somewhat higher, since they might use financial vehicles to tap 
international markets. The upper bound of their issuances is given by private non-banks’ 
debt issuances, which hovered around 200 US bn in 2013, and could reach similar numbers 
2014 – as shown in Chart 1 –. 
1 Introduction
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SOURCES: Chui et al. (2014); and BIS Debt Securities by Nationality.
a Net debt to earnings is obtained from Chui et al. (2014). It is dejned as net debt (total debt-cash) to earnings; simple average of seven emerging economies 
(obtained with jrm-level data from S&P IQ). International debt issuances by nationality, of all emerging economies, sum of the last four quarters. Non-bank 
internacional issuances include issuances of non-jnancial corporations and other jnancial corporations. This is an upper bound of non-jnancial corporations 
issuances, as it takes into account issuances by jnancial vehicles incorporated overseas.   
1  The process can reflect financial disintermediation, driven by global banks’ deleveraging [BIS (2013), Serena Garralda 
(2014)], probably fostered by low returns in traditional assets and search for yield [Lo Luca et al. (2014)].
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Large international debt issuances have been often a telltale sign of mounting balance-
sheet risks. Unsurprisingly, the process has attracted considerable attention, not least 
since emerging economies’ non-financial corporations’ soundness is worsening in parallel. 
Chart 1 shows how net debt to earnings – a popular measure of debt-service capacity –
has increased in a number of emerging economies. There are also signs of increasing 
leverage, exhaustion of debt-service capacity, and lacking room to withstand financial 
shocks [IMF (2014a, 2014c), Chui et al. (2014), CGFS-FSB-SCAV (2014)]. More specific, 
regional, analyses have identified similar patterns of rising corporate leverage and risks, in 
Asia and Latin America [IMF (2014B), IADB (2014)]. 
But, in spite of this seeming relation, no link between the build-up of firms’ vulnerabilities 
and the broad-based access to international capital markets has been established. Firms’ 
leverage can be fuelled by other factors. Local capital markets are experiencing also a 
strong development, and to some extent are attracting large inflows of foreign investors. 
Domestic credit remains a dominant source of financing, and credit has grown strongly 
[Morgan Stanley (2014)]. 
As a consequence, large international debt issuances are not necessarily a sign of lacking 
market discipline in international capital markets, or mounting risks in emerging markets’ 
corporations. In fact, there is substantial uncertainty on the soundness of firms tapping 
international markets. Many questions remain open. Do large bond issuances reflect a 
relaxation in credit standards, so that even overstretched firms can tap markets? Or, on 
the contrary, does this trend reflect a genuine deepening in international capital markets, 
and only sound firms are able to issue corporate bonds? 
Answering these questions is key. If firms able to tap international markets are not more 
vulnerable than in past, large international debt issuances are probably a sign of transition 
towards a more market-based corporate financing. The process can reflect a substitution of 
global banks by alternative, less traditional lenders, making instrumental the understanding 
of their investment strategies. The analysis of firms’ balance-sheets turns crucial not only to 
determine whether market discipline has changed over time, but also to assess whether 
firms have become more susceptible to shocks.
In this paper, we aim to shed light on these issues, by investigating if firms’ tapping 
international bond markets show more vulnerable balance sheets than historical records. 
To address these questions, we delve into a number of balance-sheet metrics, and also on 
bonds features. We focus on leverage, debt-service capacity, profitability, and liquidity, 
and also on maturities and yields. Building on descriptive evidence, and a non-parametric 
analysis, we find that firms tapping markets are not more leveraged than in past. They are, 
however, less profitable, they have improved their liquidity profile, and show higher debt-
service capacity. Moreover, firms are able to tap international capital markets at better 
conditions, since yields have compressed, and maturities lengthened. Beyond this big 
picture, we identify tail risks. Measured in absolute terms, issuances by more overstretched 
firms have increased. There are also severe data gaps, since there is substantially less 
information for non-listed firms. According to most metrics, these firms are less sound. We 
identify as well pockets of vulnerability, since highly-leveraged firms are also those with 
less debt-service capacity and low profitability. For comparison purposes, we investigate 
also developments in local capital markets. Firms tapping local markets have better 
balance-sheets than in past. Their financial conditions have become similar to firms issuing 
bonds overseas. 
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By investigating these issues, our paper is making two contributions. First, we construct a 
novel database, which contains information on bond issuances and firms’ balance-sheets. 
A key feature of our database is that, to gather non-financial corporations’ bond issuances, 
we use the country and sector of the company in which ultimately the risk lies – this need not 
be the ultimate parent company –. This way we are able to track non-financial corporations’ 
issuances also if they use financial affiliates incorporated overseas. A second attractive 
feature is that it comprises information on firm´s balance sheet characteristics. The data 
covers the period 2000-2013, and the initial sample includes 13,199 bonds issued from 
2,773 companies, and includes both domestic and international issuances. Second, we are 
contributing to the research investigating the risks stemming from disintermediation in 
international markets. Previous research had focused on bonds features, and the entry of 
new investors in emerging economies fixed-income markets. Existing evidence suggests 
that bond maturities are longer, which supports that firms have an easier access to capital 
markets [Shin (2014)]. Also, recent analyses have shown that US dollar bonds still overshadow 
issuances denominated in domestic currencies [Gruic and Wooldridge (2013)].2 By delving 
into firms’ soundness, we are shedding light on demand factors. Overall, we find that 
borrowers’ fundamentals have not improved. The ability to tap markets, at long tenors and 
low prices, does not seem to derive from an improvement on firms’ balance-sheets. 
Accordingly, it probably stems from global factors, such as very low interest rates in 
advanced economies and the larger presence of institutional investors (insurance companies 
and pension funds). Our results suggest that credit risk might remain subdued, but the 
lengthening of maturities can pose significant market risks. From the perspective of firms, 
their access to markets can be curtailed in case of changes in risk appetitive, or a rise in 
long-term interest rates. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss the main features of 
our database, and how it compares with alternative sources of information. In section 3, we 
investigate the main features of firms’ tapping international capital markets. We provide 
descriptive evidence, and a non-parametric analysis. In section 4, we compare the evolution 
with local capital markets. Finally, in section 6 we present the main conclusion. 
To investigate firm’s access to capital markets, it is instrumental to have joint information on 
non-financial corporations’ bond issuances and their balance-sheet characteristics. We 
collect this information in two steps. Firstly, we obtain bond-level information on non-
financial corporations’ issuances in local and international markets. Secondly, for each 
company tapping capital markets, we get its balance-sheet information, if it is available. As 
we discuss below, the coverage is uneven and there are important data gaps. All in all, our 
initial sample includes 13,199 bonds issued by 2,773 firms of 36 emerging economies.3 
Collecting information on non-financial corporations’ bond issuances is challenging, in 
particular for international deals, and requires a number of methodological decisions. Most 
of the problems stem from the fact that firms can carry out operations which, in spite of 
having similar economic implications in terms of risk and liquidity, have very different 
structures. Firms can carry out deals using affiliates in different locations, which even have 
different sectors of activity. For instance, some large firms tap international markets through 
2  Measuring bond 
issuances and firms’ 
balance sheets. 
Data issues
2.1  MEASURING BOND 
ISSUANCES ON AN 
ULTIMATE RISK BASIS
2  Although some emerging markets firms are tapping international markets in their domestic currency.
3  Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela; Emerging Europe 
includes Bulgaria, Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine; Africa & Middle East includes Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
UAE. Asia includes India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, South Korea.
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affiliates (i.e. subsidiaries, or special investment vehicles) incorporated overseas. As 
stressed by Shin (2013) and Turner (2014), classifying these deals according to the direct 
issuer’s nationality would be misleading, since they are issuing debt on behalf of their 
parent company. This problem is often overcome using the ultimate parent company 
nationality – the BIS nationality criterion –, which is becoming standard. A similar problem 
arises with the sector classification. If non-financial corporations use financial affiliates (for 
instance, a special investment vehicle) to issue bonds, classifying deals according to the 
affiliate’s sector would underestimate non-financial bond issuances.
In short, using information on the direct issuer to identify these deals is troublesome – in 
particular, as previously said, for international issuances, since firms can use complex ways 
of carrying out deals –. Accordingly, our decision consists in identifying deals according to 
the country and sector of the company in which, at the end of the day, the risk lies. This need 
not lie in the ultimate parent company, as we discuss below. It can be considered as a 
measure on an “ultimate risk basis”. To identify these deals, we delve into the country of risk, 
which is identified by Bloomberg using four factors. Listed in order of importance, these 
factors are the management location; country of primary listing; country of revenue, and the 
reporting currency of the issuer. 
Using this criterion, we obtain bond-level information for non-financial companies operating 
in Emerging Asia, Latin America, Emerging Europe, and Africa and Middle East. Table 1 
provides some descriptive statistics: the number of bonds issued in the four geographic 
areas, the total volume issued, and the average size of the deal. We expect these numbers 
to be very close to the full universe of corporate bonds. Latin America and Asia are by far 
the regions where firms are more active in international markets, both in terms of firms and 
bonds. Local markets are of similar size, although there are more firms active – and bonds 
are, on average, smaller –4. The development of local markets is higher in Asia. 
Bonds
Number Volume Average deal
Bonds at international markets
    Total 2,391 971,281 406 890
    Latin America 1,037 518,104 500 301
    Africa & Middle East 121 77,447 640 55
    Emerging Europe 328 161,178 491 157
    Asia 905 214,552 237 377
Bonds at local markets
    Total 10,808 1,259,770 117 1883
    Latin America 1,559 265,518 170 551
    Africa & Middle East 317 64,297 203 81
    Emerging Europe 950 146,992 155 427
    Asia 7,982 782,963 98 824
Fiirms
BOND ISSUANCES. STYLIZED FACTS (a) TABLE 1 
  
SOURCES: Bloomberg and own elaboration.
a Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela; Emerging Europe includes Bulgaria, Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine; Africa & Middle East includes Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, UAE. Asia includes India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, South Korea. 
4  We show as well the number of firms which have tapped markets in the period under analysis. The number of 
bonds issued is, by construction, at least equal to the number of firms, since some companies have tapped 
markets in several years. If a company taps markets several times in a year, we group the issuances into a single 
deal. The size is the sum of the volumes issued that year, and for bond’s features (maturity, rating, coupon), we 
keep the average of the deals.
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Chart 2 depicts the historical evolution of bond issuances, for the period 2000-2013. Bond 
issuances, measured with our data, show an upward trend, consistently with other sources 
of information. The volume issued is higher than the volume issued obtained by Dealogic. 
This gap can stem from some methodological differences and coverage, which make them 
not entirely comparable. 
For instance, the criterion we use to identify non-financial corporations issuances is fairly 
close to the nationality classification, but with two differences. On the one hand, if a parent 
company does not support or guarantee explicitly an affiliate, we classify the latter’s 
issuances with its own country and sector. We aim to reflects that the ultimate risk is 
retained by this affiliate. On the other hand, the sectoral classification is always that of the 
company in which the risk ultimately lies. This way we track non-financial corporations’ 
issuances also when they carry out deals using affiliated financial vehicles incorporated 
overseas. Table 2 shows some examples of these types of deals. Appendix 1 provides 
more information on data issues.
The next step to assess the soundness of firms tapping capital markets is to gather their 
balance-sheets, and select a number of relevant indicators. Ideally, we would like to obtain 
full balance-sheet information for every company tapping capital markets. In practice, the 
coverage is uneven, and there are important data gaps, which we discuss below. 
2.2 FIRMS’ BALANCE SHEETS 
DEBT ISSUANCES OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, MEASUREMENT ISSUES (a) CHART 2 
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SOURCES: Bloomberg and Dealogic.
a The chart depicts Dealogic data (gross international bond issuances by nationality),  and our data sample, gathered using Bloomberg. There are methodological 
differences between the series. Bloomberg data identijes the country and sector delving into the company which ultimately holds the risk.   
00 01 02 03 04  05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Company Name Parent Company
Country of 
Incorporation
Country of Risk CUSIP
Amount
(USD bln)
Petrobras Global Finance BV PETROBRAS - PETROLEO BRAS-PR Netherlands Brazil 71647NAF6 3.5
Lukoil International Finance BV LUKOIL OAO Netherlands Russia EJ6431419 1.5
Gazprom Neft OAO Via GPN Capital SA GAZPROM NEFT OAO-CLS Luxemburg Russia EJ9515473 1.5
Russian Railways via RZD Capital PLC RUSSIAN RAILWAYS JSC Ireland Russia EJ6158582 1.3
AngloGold Ashanti Holdings PLC ANGLOGOLD ASHANTI LTD Isle of Man South Africa 03512TAD3 1.3
Metalloinvest Finance Ltd METALLOINVEST HOLDING CO OAO Ireland Russia EJ8456547 1.0
SABIC Capital II BV SAUDI BASIC INDUSTRIES CORP Netherland Saudi Arabia EJ8456547 1.0
EXAMPLES OF BONDS ISSUED BY FINANCIAL SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES TABLE 2 
SOURCE: Bloomberg. 
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To choose these metrics, we leverage on previous research, and follow recent analyses on 
firms’ vulnerabilities [IMF (2014a, 2014b)]. We end up choosing six indicators to analyze 
different and specific features of firms’ soundness: leverage, debt service capacity, solvency, 
liquidity, and current and prospective profitability. To assess leverage, we use total assets to 
common equity (for shortness, we refer to it as leverage). As a solvency measure, we include 
the debt to EBITDA. It assesses the size of debt relative to current earnings (its fluctuations 
often have to do with sharp changes in benefits, more than swings in debt). To assess the 
risks of short-term financial problems, we include the interest coverage ratio, which is a 
popular measure of the ability to service debt. It measures earnings relative interest 
payments. We use two measures of profitability. The return on assets (ROA) allows assessing 
current profitability. To grasp long-term prospects, we look at capital expenditures growth 
(CAPEX growth). Firms investing are expected to have brighter prospects. Finally, to gauge 
liquidity, we include the current ratio. It is defined as the ratio of liquid assets to short-term 
liabilities. It allows grasping if a firm can disinvest in order to pay its short-term obligations. 
Table 3 shows the metrics chosen, and the number of firms for which we have information.5 
Our balance-sheet information is, at first glance, rather informative. The number of firms 
with information hovers around 700-1,000, depending on their indicator. The volume 
issued by these firms represents around 55%-80% of the total volume of bonds. However, 
the coverage is uneven. To this regard, a key dimension is a firm’s market status. Unlike 
traditional data sources, our data set contains information on non-listed firms. However, 
the coverage is much better for listed than for non-listed firms. Appendix 1 discusses this 
issue, providing further information on our balance-sheet data, and how it compares with 
other data sources. 
To investigate firms’ access to international markets, we analyze their balance sheets, and 
the main features of their bonds issuances. Both are relevant to understand how market 
discipline and financing conditions have evolved over time. The four dimensions of the 
firm´s financial health we look at are leverage, profitability, solvency and liquidity. To gauge 
bonds features, we look at coupon and maturity. 
We proceed in four steps. Firstly, we provide some preliminary evidence. Second, we use 
a non-parametric analysis to investigate if distributions have shifted over time. Third, we 
3  Firms’ vulnerabilities 
and access to 
international capital 
markets
3.1  FRAMEWORK 
FOR ANALYSIS
5  As described in note 4, we are grouping all bond issuances within a year into a single deal. Hence, we have only 
one observation (balance-sheet information) for each year in which the firm taps markets (even if the firm carries 
out several issuances). We drop bonds with volumes lower than 30 US million to avoid a large bias towards small 
issuers. These bonds represent just 1.3% of total amount issued.
Observations
Firms As % of amount issued
Leverage Total assets to common equity (leverage) 1,001 73.33
Projtability Return on Assets 868 65.82
Debt service capacity Interest Coverage Ratio 1,010 74.68
Long-term prospects CAPEX-capital expenditures 724 57.77
Solvency Debt to EBITDA 1,037 77.80
Liquidity Current ratio 1,052 77.32
Concept Variable
 BALANCE-SHEET SOUNDNESS. METRICS (a) TABLE 3 
  
SOURCES: Bloomberg and own elaboration.
a For jrms tapping international capital markets. Issuances of the same jrm in different years are counted as different observations.
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investigate tail risks, which we define as the volume issued by weak firms, according to the 
metrics analyzed (leverage, profitability, solvency, liquidity). Finally, we analyze jointly all 
variables, to fully grasp firms’ financial conditions.
Overall, firms’ balance-sheets are not significantly worse than pre-crisis levels, although 
they have changed. We find that firms are less profitable, they have a better liquidity profile, 
more ability to service debt, and similar leverage. At the same time bonds coupons have 
decreased and maturities have lengthened, improving corporate financing conditions. 
These findings may be in line with a change towards more market-based corporate 
financing, although it is not clear that this trend will continue after global interest rates 
return to normalized levels. Moreover, the sheer increase in total issuances implies that the 
volume issued by weak firms is on the rise.
In Chart 3 we show the historical evolution of a number descriptive statistics for each of 
the balance-sheet metrics under analysis. We include the median, and the interquartile 
range. All these statistics are computed on a yearly basis, for all firms issuing bonds 
overseas. Therefore, each graph shows how firms tapping international markets in a given 
year compare, in the dimension under analysis, with firms acceding markets in other 
periods of time. These statistics are robust to outliers, in particular in the latest years, 
when the number of firm is fairly large. 
The evolution of leverage is shown in Chart 3.1. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total 
assets to common equity, so larger values indicate that the firm is relying more on debt 
(instead of raising common equity) to meet its financing needs. Highly leveraged firms may 
be more likely to suffer from financial stress under adverse scenarios (fall in profits, 
decreasing liquidity…) due to their larger debt servicing costs. Leverage has remained 
broadly constant over time, in spite of the large issuances of the last years. Indeed, during 
the last two years we observe a slight reduction. 
We find, however, that firms tapping international markets are less profitable than before the 
global financial crisis. In Chart 3.2 we assess the profitability of firms tapping international 
markets by delving into the return on assets, or ROA. In the last years the ROA remains stable 
around 4%, at much lower levels than before the crisis.6
On the contrary, the solvency of firms issuing bonds overseas does not seem compromised. 
We gauge the solvency of firms, in Chart 3.3, using interest coverage ratio, or ICR. The 
ratio is defined as earnings before interest and taxes to total interest expenses. Abnormally 
low levels of ICR (below one) put firms under stress and compromise their future viability. 
The interest coverage ratio was lower in the immediate aftermath of the global financial 
crisis, driven by a contraction in profits, but has recovered since then. In 2013, it is similar 
to the pre-crisis levels.7 
Finally, we find as well an improvement in liquidity. To study firms’ liquidity we use the 
current ratio (current assets/current liabilities). Current assets are defined as all assets that 
are reasonably expected to be converted into cash within one year. Current liabilities are 
3.2 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
6  The ROA is also related to economic growth. Since there has been a worldwide economic slowdown, it is not 
rare that firms issuing bonds in international markets show lower profitability. In other words, we are not looking 
at their relative profitability, compared with advanced economies firms.
7  These results are robust when we use, as an alternative measure of financial solvency, the debt to earnings ratio. 
This measure shows how many years would take to repay current debt at the present level of EBITDA (earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization). This variable has shown a similar behaviour than the ICR 
over time, with a large deterioration after 2009 and some recovery during the last two years.
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those liabilities due within one year. The main trend, depicted in Chart 3.4, is an overall 
increase in firms’ liquidity in the last years, after the large contraction experienced during 
the global financial crisis. Liquidity has improved since 2009 and it is on the rise. This may 
be due, in part, to the longer maturities of corporate bonds issued during the last years. 
Overall, balance-sheet metrics do not show a general deterioration with respect to the pre-
crisis levels. However, access to markets is easier. A telltale indicator is the increase in 
volumes issued. But also maturities have lengthened and coupons have fallen, reducing 
roll-over risk and debt servicing costs. Chart 3.5 shows how the coupon has fallen over 
time, reaching in 2013 an all-time low. This in stark contrast with the evolution of spreads 
BALANCE-SHEET METRICS AND BOND FEATURES (a) CHART 3 
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– a measure of risk appetite – which have increased compared to pre-crisis levels (see 
Appendix 1 for details).8 Maturities have also increased. In Chart 3.6 we show the weighted-
average maturity (since maturity is a very discrete measure, it is a better statistics than the 
median). Tenors have increased over time, consistently with previous research [Shin (2014)]. 
So far we have used the median and the interquartile range to characterize the balance-
sheet indicators and bond´s features. These statistics provide a partial picture of their main 
features, which are fully characterized by the density function. To better understand how 
firms’ financial conditions have evolved over time and study the distribution of our selected 
variables, we perform a non-parametric analysis by carrying out a kernel density estimation.
The simplest and one of the oldest non-parametric estimators of the density function is the 
histogram. Although it is a useful tool, it has the drawbacks of being discontinuous and too 
“rough”. In more general density estimates, intervals are allowed to overlap and a kernel 
density estimator assigns a weight to each observation (the function determining these 
weights is called kernel). Among various methods of density estimation the kernel estimator 
is better developed, both with respect to its numerical calculations and known analytical 
properties.
The kernel density estimator f ^ (x) off can be written as:
Where K is the kernel function, h is the window width, and wi is the weight function, which 
depends on the distance of xi from x and the sample size through h. According to this definition 
the density function f will be estimated at a point x using the observations x1,…,xn from f. It is 
well known that the choice of kernel is a minor issue but the selection of the window width h is 
crucial. We use in our estimation the “optimal” width, the one that minimizes the mean 
integrated square error9 (MISE) E {∫[f ^ (x)–f(x)]2 dx}. 
We estimate density functions for the period before the financial crisis (2000-2007), after 
the crisis (20010-2013), and for the year 2013 alone.10 Chart 4 depicts those estimated 
densities for the main variables of interest. Overall the results draw similar conclusions 
than those obtained from the descriptive statistics. 
Leverage does not show relevant changes over time while the distribution of current ratio 
and interest-coverage ratio has improved with respect to pre-crisis levels. The ROA 
displays a clear worsening, with more weight assigned to lower values for the periods after 
the crisis. It does not seem to be an overall deterioration of the balance-sheet fundamentals 
compared to the conditions before the crisis, especially if we compare the distribution for 
year 2013.
3.3  NON-PARAMETRIC 
ANALYSIS
8   We compute the difference between coupons and Treasury rates for bonds denominated in dollars. Spreads 
show the lowest values over the period 2005-2007, experiencing an increase afterwards.
9   For highly skewed densities this optimal width is usually too wide and oversmooths the density. We perform 
some robustness checks using other widths to deal with this problem, obtaining similar results. show the lowest 
values over the period 2005-2007, experiencing an increase afterwards.
10  Macroeconomic developments (ie, global economic growth) may be important drivers of some variables 
evolution. To check this we compute the density functions using 2000-2005 as our base period (we remove years 
2006 and 2007, of abnormally high global economic growth). Our results are qualitatively similar to the ones 
depicted from the density functions estimated over 2000-2007. The main difference comes from the density of 
ROA, which shows a similar shape over the periods 2000-2005 and 2013. To that extent, if we use 2000-2005 as 
our base period we do not observe a deterioration of ROA.
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With respect to bonds features, coupons and terms show the same patterns we have 
already documented. Kernel density estimations show more weight on lower coupons 
compared to pre-crisis levels. They also show more weight on longer maturities. This is in 
line with our previous results and supports the view of a change towards easier access to 
capital markets without an overall improvement of balance-sheet fundamentals.
Tail risks can be defined as those stemming from the volume issued by overstretched firms. 
Weak firms are those which, in absolute terms, have worrisome balance-sheet metrics. The 
evidence shown so far suggests that tail risks could be on the rise. The sheer increase in 
debt issuances implies that, everything else equal, issuances by vulnerable firms could be 
3.4 TAIL RISKS
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increasing in absolute terms. Moreover, tail risks fluctuate with the type of firms acceding 
international markets. Accordingly, a shift towards a riskier distribution – i.e., weaker firms 
acceding markets – is associated with more risks on the tails, and the non-parametric 
analysis has shown some shifts in the distributions, which are worrisome in terms of 
profitability (ROA). 
To investigate tail risks, we identify weak firms defining, for each variable, three thresholds, 
which we choose following IMF (2014b). Firms are then classified in four buckets according 
to their balance-sheet soundness. As in our previous analyses, we look at leverage, ROA, 
interest coverage ratio, and the current ratio. 
In Chart 5 we depict the volume of issuances by firms with high leverage, low profitability, low 
solvency, and low liquidity. It is apparent that tail risks – the volume issued by weak firms – are 
on the rise, although not at the same speed in all dimensions. The increase in issuances by 
low profitable firms, depicted in Chart 5.2, is particularly remarkable. Firms with negative 
profits have issued more than 30 US bn in 2013, a fourfold increase with respect to 2010. This 
reflects that low profitable firms are increasingly tapping international markets.
There is also a substantial increase in the volume issued by firms with low interest coverage 
ratio (Chart 5.3). Their issuances amounted for more than 10 US bn in every year after the 
crisis, in stark contrast with the pre-crisis period, when they were negligible. Chart 7.1 
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shows that highly leveraged firms (those with leverage over 4) have issued bonds 
amounting for 60 US bn in 2013. This number is very large in absolute terms, and it is three 
times higher than the pre-crisis numbers. Similarly, issuances by firms with low liquidity 
have increased in absolute size, and already amount for 30 US bn. Overall, issuances by 
firms which are weak, in absolute terms, have increased. This suggests that, beyond the 
average developments, some risks are building up in the tails. 
To further investigate the build-up of tail risks, in Chart 6 we break down the volume issued 
by corporations, according to firms’ level of soundness. Red bars represent the proportion 
of issuances which are due for weak firms, while green bars represent issuances of sound 
firms. It is apparent that the risks are building up more sharply in profitability. In 2013, 
issuances by firms with negative profits amounted for close to 20% of the total. In parallel, 
the volume issued by highly profitable firms has decreased, so that in 2013 it accounted for 
30% of the total. This is by far the lowest proportion in our sample. The picture does not 
seem either bright enough for solvency – measured by the interest coverage ratio –. It is 
apparent in Chart 6.3 that issuances by firms with low ICR amounted for 10% of the total. 
Still, issuances by firms with high ICR (above 10) accounted for more than 50% of the 
volume issued in 2013. Although this is not a high number, compared with pre-crisis levels, 
it implies a correction with respect to 2011, when they were as low as 20% of the total.
RISK ASSESMENT. DISTRIBUTION OF ISSUANCES BY LEVELS OF BALANCE-SHEET VARIABLES (a) CHART 6 
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In contrast, the proportion of debt issued by firms with high leverage or low liquidity has 
decreased over time. Issuances by firms with leverage over 4 – the threshold to classify 
high-leveraged firms – represent a decreasing proportion of the total. A similar mild 
assessment emerges when we analyze the distribution of the volume of issuances 
according to firms’ liquidity, in Chart 6.4. Issuances by highly liquid firms (green bars) have 
decreased, but in benefit of medium-to-high liquid firms (yellow bars). Both types of firms 
accounted for 55% of total issuances in 2013, a high number for historical standards.
Next we perform a joint assessment of firms’ vulnerabilities. In Chart 7.1 we display the 
values of all the balance-sheet metrics in 2013, after normalizing its values. This way we 
can compare them, at the same time, with the existing values in the period before the crisis 
(2000-2007). The closer are these values to the outer line, the better the current situation, 
compared to historical records. 
The chart shows additional information though, as we add two more variables: debt to 
EBITDA and the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. The debt to EBITDA, refers 
to the long-term solvency prospects of the firm, complementing somehow the interest 
coverage ratio, which refers more to the short-term (debt to EBITDA is also commonly 
used as an indicator of leverage). In addition, capital expenditure adds another perspective 
to firms’ profitability, being an indicator of expected future returns.
Overall we derive similar conclusions as those coming from the previous sections: we find 
similar levels of leverage, a fall in profitability and some improvement on the liquidity profile 
and solvency. Debt to EBIDTDA has not changed significantly compared to the pre-crisis 
period, experiencing some deterioration during 2013. CAPEX growth has improved slightly 
over time, mitigating to some extent the poor performance of the return on assets.
These findings reinforce that there is not an overall deterioration of balance-sheet 
soundness. However, previous analysis of tail risk displayed an increase in the volumes of 
corporate bonds issued by overstretched firms. Accordingly, in Chart 7.2 we conduct a 
3.5  HOW VULNERABLE ARE, 
OVERALL, FIRMS TAPPING 
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS?
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similar analysis for firms with the largest levels of leverage in 2013. We analyze firms within 
the 75 (95)-percentile of leverage, corresponding to levels of leverage greater than 3.4 
(10.1). The closer these values are to the outer line, the more similar highly-leveraged firms 
are to the full population of firms. 
It is apparent the worsening of balance-sheet indicators among these firms, since these 
firms’ balance-sheet metrics are far from the outer line. The evolution of the interest 
coverage ratio and return on assets are especially worrisome, not even reaching half of the 
level achieved by the total sample of firms. Moreover, the return on assets turns negative 
for those firms within the 95-percentile of leverage. 
All in all, highly leveraged corporations seem to be hiding a “pocket of risk” which it is not 
apparent at the aggregate level. These firms are also in a weaker situation, in other dimensions. 
The tightening of financing conditions may put under pressure these highly leveraged firms, 
since debt service costs would increase. This may create feed-back loops resulting in further 
erosion of profits and more difficulties to pay interest expenses. Moreover, a contraction of 
risk appetite by international investors may result in re-financing problems for these firms. 
The next section further develops on other potential “pockets of risk”.
Our general findings can mask pockets of risks, and data gaps can be particularly severe 
in some segments. Hence, in this section we study some groups of firms that deserve 
further attention: non-listed firms and new issuers. Moreover, we investigate developments 
in local markets. This is interesting for comparison purposes, since issuances in local 
markets have also increased rapidly in the last years. 
Non-listed firms account for a large proportion of international issuances.11 These firms 
face fewer requirements to publicly release their balance-sheet information, being more 
difficult to assess their financial health. Given the large amount of issuances made by 
these firms, there is an important “data gap” on non-listed corporations, since standard 
sources of information fail to cover these firms. Our data set includes some information for 
non-listed companies, although it is far less comprehensive. This is apparent in Chart 8.1, 
which shows the balance-sheet data coverage and volumes of international issuances by 
market status.12 For the period 2010-2013 there is, on average, balance-sheet information 
available for 69% for non-listed firms, in contrast with the coverage of 97 percent of the 
total volume issued by listed firms. 
The data gap is severe, so we cannot provide conclusions on the financial conditions of non-
listed firms. However, in Chart 8.2 we compare the balance-sheet indicators of listed and 
non-listed firms. The results have to be assessed with caution, but overall non-listed firms 
show weaker conditions in 2013, with the return on assets being half of that for listed 
corporations. The situation is even worse for highly leveraged non-listed firms, which show 
worrisome levels of profitability (negative ROA) and solvency. This suggests that vulnerabilities 
can be building up in non-listed firms. 
We next analyze the balance-sheet soundness of those firms tapping international capital 
markets for the first time.13 Lower creditworthiness of these firms could be a sign of a more 
4  Data gaps and pockets 
of risk
4.1 NON-LISTED COMPANIES 
4.2 FIRST-TIME ISSUERS
11  During 2013 non-listed firms’ issuances reached $69.6 billion (42% of total issuances).
12  Bloomberg only reports current market status such that the classification corresponds to 2014 independently 
of the issue date.
13  We do not have issuance records before the year 2000 such that new issuers in a given years are those firms 
which had not issued bonds, at least, since the year 2000.
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relaxed market discipline and the presence of another potential “pocket of risk”. The 
number of firms issuing bonds for the first time experienced a large fall in 2008, and it has 
recovered during 2013 (see Chart 9.1). 
At the same time, average volumes issued by firms have increased since 2008, reaching a 
record high in 2013. Chart 9.2 shows that new issuers have similar financial conditions as 
those firms previously tapping international capital markets, displaying even better levels 
of debt to EBITDA, interest coverage ratio and ROA in 2013. As new issuers are at least as 
sound as previous issuers, it seems that investors are being able to keep credit standards 
NON-LISTED FIRMS: COVERAGE AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS CHART 8 
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8.2  RELATIVE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS OF NON-LISTED FIRMS (b) 
SOURCE: Bloomberg.
a Market status in 2014. 
b Blue line represents standarized values (100) for the median of each variable for listed jrms. Red (green)  line shows  values for each variable of non-listed jrms, 
relative to the standarized values of listed jrms in 2007 (2013). Orange line shows  values for each variable for highly leverage non-listed jrms, those within the 
75 percentile of leverage. Non-listed jrms show weaker jnancial conditions both in 2007 and 2013, and those highly leveraged present even weaker jnancial 
soundness. Values for ROA turn out to be negative within the 75 percentile of leverage and we have assinged a standarized value of zero.  
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9.2  RELATIVE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS OF NEW ISSUERS (b) 
SOURCE: Bloomberg.
a New issuers within our sample (2000-2013). Red bars show the average amount issued every year (total amount issued by new issuers/number of new issuers).  
b Blue line represents standarized values (100) for the median of each variable for jrms that have previously issued international bonds. Red (green) line shows  
values for new issuers of international bonds relative to the  standarized values for old issuers in 2007 (2013).  New issuers show similar jnancial conditions than 
old issuers, especially in 2013, displaying  even better levels of ICR, ROA  and debt to EBITDA. 
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at the same level to those firms with previous reputation as issuers in international capital 
markets. Moreover, as we find that new issuers have slightly better financial conditions, it 
may be the case that these firms need to have sounder balance-sheets in order to access 
capital markets.
Domestic capital markets have also experienced a strong development during the last 
decade. Volumes issued have grown steadily over time, without suffering the large 
contraction documented on international issuances during 2008 (see Chart 10.1). Besides, 
total amounts issued have surpassed those in international markets every year. 
These developments are mainly due to the deepening of Asian markets,14 although the 
other regions have also followed similar trends. Balance-sheet data coverage is uneven as 
there is less information for firms tapping local markets, mainly due to the larger proportion 
of non-listed firms.
Chart 10.2 shows balance-sheet information on domestic issuers relative to that of 
international issuers. We find similar financial conditions between both groups of firms 
during 2013, although domestic issuers show weaker current ratios and lower levels of 
capital expenditure. On the other hand, figures in 2007 reveal that financial conditions 
were much weaker for domestic firms at that time. Interestingly, levels of leverage have 
barely changed. Finally, we also assess the financial soundness of more leveraged firms 
and non-listed firms. As we previously found with international issuers, non-listed and 
more leveraged corporations show weaker financial conditions, resulting in a similar 
“pocket of risk” that the one documented on firms tapping international capital markets.
Summarizing, credit risk do not seem to be much larger for domestic issuers, and local 
capital markets have been a more reliable source of funding during the height of the 
4.3 LOCAL MARKETS
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10.2  RELATIVE FINANCIAL CONDITIONS OF DOMESTIC ISSUERS (b) 
SOURCE: Bloomberg.
a Market status in 2014. 
b Blue line represents standarized values (100) for the median of each variable for international issuers. Red (green) line shows values for each variable for jrms issuing 
bonds only in domestic markets relative to the standarized values of jrms tapping international capital markets in 2007 (2013). Orange line shows  values for each 
variable for highly leveraged (those in the 75 percentile of leverage) non-listed jrms issuing bonds only in domestic markets. Domestic issuers seem to have weaker 
jnancial conditions, especially those highly leveraged and non-listed. 
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14  Asian capital markets accounted for 50% of total volume issued in domestic markets during 2013.
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financial crisis. On the other hand, financing conditions are tougher, with domestic issuers 
paying larger coupons and facing shorter maturities.
In this paper we investigate if firms’ tapping international markets show more vulnerable 
balance sheets than historical records, using a novel data set constructed with Bloomberg, 
which contains information on bond issuances and firms’ balance-sheets for the period 
2000-2013. 
We document a large increase in bond issuances, as it is observed in research using other 
data sets. Our analyses suggest that, in spite of these large issuances, firms’ tapping 
markets are not weaker than in past. Though, their access to international capital markets 
is easier, since yields have compressed, and maturities lengthened. We identify as well a 
build-up of tail risks, since the volume issued by more overstretched firms has increased. 
There are also severe data gaps, particularly among non-listed companies.
These findings raise several unknowns, which are key to assess risks for financial stability. 
A major issue is the possible existence of cross-country or regional heterogeneity. 
Identifying sectoral patterns is also relevant, since access to corporate capital markets is 
deemed to carry more risks for firms of the non-tradable sector. Overall, our general 
findings can mask pockets of risks, and data gaps can be particularly severe in some 
segments. 
Our paper also poses questions on the drivers and risks of the process. Our results imply 
that the development of international capital markets does not seem to derive from an 
improvement on firms’ balance-sheets. Accordingly, global factors probably have a 
relevant role. The lengthening of maturities suggests that institutional investors, with 
longer-term investment strategies, can be entering the market. Though, this requires to be 
investigated. As for the risks, our findings suggest that investors are not acquiring more 
credit risk, but they are becoming exposed to significant market risk. Large issuances 
coincide with longer tenors, implying longer durations of their fixed-income portfolios. 
Additionally, investors face a period of abnormal low market liquidity in emerging markets 
fixed-income. Finally, it turns crucial to investigate if the distinction between local and 
international markets is becoming blurred, in the current context of ample liquidity. We 
provide preliminary results suggesting that firms’ tapping in local and international markets 
have more similar balance-sheets than in past. The issue requires, however, a more in-
depth analysis. 
From the perspective of borrowers, it is also crucial to identify how investor´s appetite 
towards emerging markets could be affected by increases in interest rates in developed 
markets, or volatility, since balance-sheet characteristics do not seem to be driving the 
rise in corporate issuances, or justify the improvement in bonds features. If global investors 
decrease their portfolio share on emerging markets, firms may find difficult to obtain 
financing at current conditions. 
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Classifying bond issuances 
In order to collect non-financial corporations’ bond issuances, it is important to choose a 
sound criterion to identify the sector and country of the issuer. This is required to separate 
non-financial corporations’ deals from those carried out by financial corporations. It is 
important also to account for all emerging corporations’ issuances, even if they use 
affiliates incorporated overseas. 
In this paper, we have identified their deals according to the country and sector of the 
company in which, at the end of the day, the risk lies. This need not lie in the ultimate 
parent company, and it can be considered as a measure on an “ultimate risk basis”. To 
identify such way the deals, we have used the country of risk, identified by Bloomberg using 
Appendix 1: 
Data Issues
Location Status
Company ultimately 
holding the risk 
Country 
of risk
Sector
1 Country A — — Company X A NFC
2 Country A Country B Financial vehicle Company X A NFC
3 Country A Country B Unlisted Company X A NFC
4 Country A Country B
Listed  and explicit support/
guarantee from the parent
Company X A NFC
5 Country A Country B
Listed company 
(independent from its parent)
Afjliate in country B B
Sector of the 
afjliate
Operation
Headquarters of 
the Company X
[non-jnancial 
corporation]
Afjliate Classijcation
 BALANCE-SHEET SOUNDNESS. METRICS (a) TABLE A.1 
  
SOURCE: Own elaboration.
a Operations 1 to 4 differ in its structure. The direct issuer can be the company X, as in (1), or an afjliate, as in 2-4; this afjliate can be either a jnancial vehicle (2), an 
unlisted afjliate (3), or a listed afjliate with explicit support from its parent (4).  Operations 1 to 4 have in common that the ultimate risk lies in the  company X. This is 
why our criterion classijes them equally. We consider them  fundamentally different from operation 5, in which the afjliate is a listed company, with no support from 
its parent, which retains the risk. Therefore, our criterion classijes this deal differently, using the afjliate information.  
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four factors. Listed in order of importance, these factors are the management location; 
country of primary listing; country of revenue, and the reporting currency of the issuer. 
To show how our criterion works, we present in table A.1 four operations (1 to 4) which, in 
spite of being structured in four different ways, have the same economic implications (in 
terms of risk and liquidity) for the non-financial corporation (i.e., “company X”). In the first 
way of structuring the operation, the company X issues directly the bond from the country 
in which the parent company headquartered. Alternatively, it can tap markets using a non-
resident financial vehicle (2), an unlisted affiliate (3), or a listed affiliate which has explicit 
support/guarantee from its parent (4). Our decision is to classify them all using the country 
of incorporation and sector of the “company X”, since ultimately it is where the risk and 
liquidity lie. This criterion is, therefore, robust to different ways of structuring operations. 
Table 1 shows as well an operation carried out by an affiliate which is a listed company, 
with no explicit support (5). Our criterion assumes it is a different operation, since the risk 
remains outside the company X. Henceforth, the deal is classified according to the 
affiliate’s nationality and sector. This is an example of an operation in which the parent 
company does not hold ultimately the risk.
Balance-sheet coverage
Chart A.1 shows the volume issued by listed and non-listed firms at international and 
local markets. It is apparent that non-listed firms account for a significant fraction of 
bond issuances, in particular at local markets. The coverage for listed companies is 
extremely high. It amounts for the 100% in the case of international issuances, and it 
is fairly close in local issuances. Information is much scarcer for non-listed companies. 
In the case of local markets, our balance-sheet information identifies less than 30% of 
the total volume issued. Moreover, the coverage has decreased in spite of the large 
growth in this type of issuances. Since Bloomberg provides only current information on 
market status, we have classified firms as listed if they are currently actively traded in an 
exchange and non-listed if they are not (non-listed firms include those acquired, delisted, 
private, unlisted, etc.).
FIRMS’ BOND ISSUANCES. BY MARKET OF ISSUANCE AND MARKET STATUS CHART A.1 
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SOURCES: Bloomberg and own elaboration.
a Market status in 2014. 
b Balance-sheet coverage of our database. The coverage is measured relative to the  total volume issued. It is apparent how information is more scarce for non-listed 
companies. Data gaps are particularly severe for  their issuances at local markets. 
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Other sources for balance-sheet analyses
Our information has strong similarities with some traditional data sources for the analysis 
of non-financial corporations’ balance-sheets, such Thomson Reuters WorldScope and 
S&P Capital IQ’s Compustat Global. These databases cover between 90%-95% of global 
market capitalization and they also provide historical data on inactive publicly held 
companies (those which have merged, liquidated or become privately held). They have 
been used in a number of recent studies on firms’ soundness [for instance, IMF (2014a, 
2014b, 2014c), Morgan Stanley (2014)]. 
However, they are not suited to delve into global investors’ discipline. They include firms 
acceding capital markets in a given year, with those which have not been active, or get 
funding from other lenders. Moreover, they focus on listed companies, offering almost no 
information on unlisted firms. This is an important caveat as the majority of non-listed firms 
do not report financial information, being difficult to assess their financial soundness. Unlike 
these traditional data sources, our balance-sheet information includes some non-listed 
firms, filling a data gap on previous studies. Although, Bloomberg does not report either 
balance-sheet information for all these companies, it provides partial information, which 
allows depicting a partial picture of non-listed firms´ financial vulnerabilities. 
Bond spreads on international issuances
Chart A.2 shows the historical evolution of the spreads of corporate bond issuances in the 
primary market. Spreads reached their lowest levels during the period 2005-2007, signaling a 
possible undervaluation of risk by international investors over those years. This is in contrast 
with yields, which reached their all-time low in 2013. We interpret that the steady fall on 
coupons over the last years it is not related to lower credit risk but to global factors (low interest 
rates on advanced economies). As for credit risk, measured as the bond spread, it remains at 
similar levels than the average over the years before the financial crisis (2000-2007). This is 
consistent with a non overall deterioration of issuers’ financial conditions, something we have 
found analyzing the balance sheet variables.
BOND SPREAD FOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUANCES DENOMINATED IN USD (a) CHART A.2 
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a Spread is the difference between the bonds' coupon and treasury rates. Amount issued by international bonds denominated in USD represents 81% of total 
issuances. 
